1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
2	SHERMAN DIVISION
3	MICHAEL MOATES )
4	MICHAEL MOATES  DOCKET NO. 4:20cv896  -vs- )
5	Plano, Texas
6	) 2:03 p.m 3:03 p.m. FACEBOOK INC., ET AL January 13, 2021
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8	TRANSCRIPT HEARING ON EMERGENCY MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
9	BY VIDEO RECORDING BEFORE THE HONORABLE KIMBERLY C. PRIEST JOHNSON,
10	UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
11	
12	<u>APPEARANCES BY VIDEO</u>
13	
14	FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
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## PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: State your appearances for the record, please.

MR. THAMES: Your Honor, Glenn Thames for Facebook, and I am joined by Chris Kearney, and Hamilton Jordan, who I should let introduce themselves so you can tell which one is which, I suppose.

MR. JORDAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. My name is Hamilton Jordan, and I am here for Facebook on behalf of the firm Keker, Van Ness & Peters.

MR. KEARNEY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. I'm Christopher Kearney also with Keker, Van Ness & Peters on behalf of Facebook.

THE COURT: Good afternoon to you all.

MR. MOATES: And this is Michael Moates. I'm here appearing pro se for myself.

THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon to you.

MR. MOATES: How are you?

THE COURT: Good. Thank you.

All right. We are proceeding by video conference here today. Sometimes there is a little bit of a delay between my asking questions and you talking. So I will try not to talk on you -- over you. It is a little bit difficult with the lag time by video.

We are here today to hear argument on Mr. Moates's

emergency motion for a temporary restraining order.

Before we begin with argument, Mr. Moates, I want to address a couple of things with you. I know you initially filed this lawsuit proceeding pro se on behalf of yourself, as well as DC Chronicle as a nonprofit charity organization.

When the Court notified you in an order that if you wanted to proceed with this lawsuit on behalf of DC Chronicle, that that entity needed to be represented by counsel, you filed a second amended complaint that only notes yourself as a Plaintiff. So I am assuming, but can you confirm, that the requested TRO applies only to yourself?

MR. MOATES: Yes, ma'am. The circumstances are a little bit different on some of the things that were in the initial TRO. But, yes, there are some parts of that that are no longer applicable.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, that will be something that you can note for me in your oral argument.

The other question that I have for you is whether this hearing today is for purposes of the requested temporary restraining order only or also for the preliminary injunction.

MR. MOATES: So, for both.

THE COURT: Okay. So you intend to present all of your evidence here today, which means it would be appropriate for the Court to go ahead and consider the issue of the

preliminary injunction, correct?

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MR. MOATES: Yes, ma'am -- yes, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. I am assuming, Mr. Moates, that you are familiar with, as they were set forth in the Defendants' response, the four elements required for you to prove -- it is your burden to prove the four elements in order to be entitled to a preliminary injunction, which means action that the Court would take prior to the normal course of action in this lawsuit.

I think from reading the briefing in this case it appears to me that you are seeking the TRO and preliminary injunction as a result of one claim, although you allege more than this one particular claim in your second amended complaint, and that is violations of the Sherman Act. Is that correct?

MR. MOTES: Yes. I -- I plan to -- and I notified the Court yesterday and then also the counselors for the Defendants, that I also intend to introduce additional evidence.

Those, like I said a minute ago, those circumstances a little bit changed whenever DC Chronicle was dropped from the lawsuit. And I notified your clerk and the counsel that it was my intention to introduce anything that was in the second amended complaint, the evidence, and potentially claims that are in those as well.

THE COURT: Okay. I am going to ask you two more specific questions, and then I will allow you to go forward and address the Court as you wish --

MR. MOATES: Okay.

THE COURT: -- particularly addressing the four elements for an injunction.

My first question is, what exactly -- what type of injunctive relief -- what is the injunctive relief that you are seeking?

MR. MOATES: So the primary request would be -- and, again, this kind of goes back to their response to me -- was to have an order requiring them to reactivate those accounts.

Now, on the face of it, the -- absent that, providing me the data and then another injunction -- or, I'm sorry, another order basically pointing that due to the fact that I am a shareholder, information needs to be provided to me that would not otherwise be available to me.

THE COURT: And what is the basis for emergency action on those two requests?

MR. MOATES: So the irreparable harm piece of that is -- so in their response they stated that their concern was that it was just a monetary value. And that is not the case here. As a shareholder, I have information that needs to be made available to me that I cannot access at this

point. And it directly affects the day-to-day operation of those shares and trading.

For example, when I say that, what I am talking about is the information that they release as part of regulation FD, and fair disclosure is done on an internal system inside of Facebook that if you do not have access to it, you cannot see that information. Without that information, there is irreparable harm. There is no way for me to access that information.

THE COURT: But what is the irreparable harm?

MR. MOATES: The damages to the shareholding. I

mean, I can give you an example. This last week Facebook

banned President Donald Trump from the platform. It was

announced on Mr. Zuckerberg's Facebook profile. And that was

a \$38 million loss for Facebook shareholders.

That information was made available on his page, which you cannot access unless you have access to Facebook. So, absent the access to his -- to being able to get onto Facebook, you don't have those disclosures that are required by the law.

THE COURT: But isn't that a monetary loss?

MR. MOATES: Not necessarily, because between the day-to-day operations, it not only affects the monetary loss, you are talking about -- what is the word I am looking for?

It is not just about value. It is about having the

information, being able to decide not only if you want to keep those shares, but also, you know, when you are talking about things like potentially being able to vote, being able to share information with other individuals, it is not -- I don't think that it is just a monetary issue.

Those shares -- even if they paid the difference down the road, those shares would still have a different value regardless of the money that was paid to make up for the loss.

THE COURT: But isn't it true -- because right now the only thing the Court's focused is on -- it is not the merits of your claims, it's whether you are entitled to emergency action, rather than action that you may be entitled to at the end of this lawsuit --

MR. MOATES: Right. Right.

THE COURT: -- so it is the only issue before the Court right now. So that is why I keep coming back to it is your burden to articulate any damages that are irreparable, and I will just say, in different terms that are not monetary and that you do allege as irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted. And that is -- I don't see that in the motion that you have filed.

MR. MOATES: So outside of -- if we step a little bit outside of what I am talking about with the regulation FD, there are a couple of other pieces that I can share with

you that are -- I would argue are irreparable.

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First of all -- and I did send counselors this information asking for assistance with this -- in their response to me, they said they would preserve the data for Facebook and Instagram. But they failed to say they would preserve the WhatsApp data, the CrowdTangle, Messenger data, and Oculus data. All of that data is part of this case.

And so in that attestation they didn't say they were going to preserve those. I did reach out to counselors and ask if we could amend that and if they would be willing to put that in writing, and I did not hear back.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me stop you right there.

MR. MOATES: Okay.

THE COURT: The lawyers have a duty to preserve information related to a lawsuit upon notice or even in anticipation of a lawsuit.

So I am going to assume that the Defense Lawyers that are present today have preserved all of that information.

And does someone want to the confirm that now?

MR. JORDAN: Your Honor, Hamilton Jordan on behalf of Facebook. Yes, I can confirm that Facebook has undertaken and is continuing to undertake reasonable efforts as required under its duties as a civil litigant -- as any civil litigant would before this Court to identify and preserve relevant

information, including information -- including all of the relevant information bearing on the known accounts of Mr. Moates.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Mr. Moates --

MR. MOATES: Your Honor, I have concerns about that statement because I was emailing with Mr. Jordan last week, and he was asking for information regarding a WhatsApp account that I do not have access to. And they have said that they are not sure they can investigate and preserve the data of the account absent the information.

So I am a little bit concerned by that statement because it seems as though they don't know all of the accounts, and that's part of the problem here.

THE COURT: Well, why don't we do this, because it is one of the things that I was going to ask you anyways because you generally reference your accounts. I know initially there were some accounts that were related to DC Chronicle, and so I was going to ask you anyway, so I will ask you now, what are the accounts that are at issue, particularly in your request for injunctive relief?

MR. MOATES: So there is the Facebook account in my name. It is Michael Moates. And that includes all of the pages, profiles, and groups -- I'm sorry, profile and groups attached to it.

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There is the Messenger account, the Facebook Messenger account, which is integrated with Facebook but also operates as a separate website, and --THE COURT: And that is under your name as well? MR. MOATES: Do what now? THE COURT: And that is under your name as well? MR. MOATES: Yes, ma'am. THE COURT: Okay. There is a CrowdTangle account which MR. MOATES: is connected to my Facebook account. But it is a third-party website. I it under my name as well. THE COURT: Okay. MR. MOATES: There is the Oculus account, which is separate, completely separate from Facebook. And it is also under my name. And then, finally, the WhatsApp account, which is under a phone number that I do not have access to. And it was stored in my Facebook account. In order to get that phone number for the counsels, I would need access to that data, which I don't have. And I notified Mr. Jordan of that last week. THE COURT: Okay. All right. I am not going to interrupt you. I am going to let you talk to me for a little

bit, Mr. Moates, specifically regarding the first two

elements is what I am really focused on, the likelihood of

success on the merits with regard to your Sherman Act claim, as well as specifically what the substantial threat of irreparable harm would be if the injunction is not granted.

MR. MOATES: Yes, ma'am.

So with regards to the first element of success on the merits, I think that the case is pretty -- pretty strong in the sense that when you talk about -- there are certain aspects of it that I think that are going to be open to interpretation. For example, the challenge of the Communications Decency Act, I expect that, you know, to be fought and argued, whatever.

But what I don't expect is -- or it very well may be challenged, and my understanding is they are going to request a transfer of the Court to the Northern District of California. What I don't expect to be an issue is the things that are specifically in the contract, for example, your page your profile, those aspects of the -- you know, the statements being made that are definitives.

For example, Facebook committing to provide me the data, which is in writing. It is in the evidence submitted in the second amended complaint where they said, here is how you get your data, here is how you do X, Y, Z. In their terms of service where it says, we will provide you with your data upon request.

These aspects are part of a very specific argument

that they have committed to do.

Now, with regards to the second piece of that, the irreparable harm, there --

THE COURT: Wait --

MR. MOATES: -- there are a lot of different --

THE COURT: -- before you move on. There are three elements to your specific claim, that Defendants engaged in a conspiracy that produced some anticompetitive effect in the relevant market. So that is what I need -- that's what you have got to show that you have -- that you are substantially likely to win on that claim as to those three elements.

MR. MOATES: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: And in what you just told me, I didn't hear anything addressed with regards to any of those three elements.

MR. MOATES: Yes, ma'am. So -- I'm sorry -- I had a moment. So to answer your -- or to respond to what you just said, as far as the market goes, so the case here -- and I submitted multiple complaints as a part of the evidence from the government, but the issue at hand here with regards to the Sherman Act is how there is a conspiracy, like you stated.

And what that is, is they are grouping together these different companies, which -- in an illegal way where WhatsApp, Instagram, CrowdTangle, Messenger, all these

companies that were bought or -- you know, by Facebook.

For example, when Instagram was acquired, they said they needed to buy -- or Mark Zuckerberg -- and I put this in my -- I believe it was the brief -- that they needed to buy it because it was the competition, and they were concerned by that.

Now, with that as -- and piece of it then there is the action that they use that that -- those acquisitions to basically target people.

I mean, for example, for me, for example, they didn't just claim that I violated one rule on one platform. They then turned around and used that power they grabbed, to ban me across all platforms. Then they targeted the competition -- and like, for example, like I said, this last week where they attempted to get other platforms -- I would need to look -- I'm sorry.

Basically, they had -- there's an issue of other platforms being able to successfully run. And as a part of that, for me, you know, there is the concern that I -- I am concerned that that information with regards to the different pieces or aspects is something that will not allow, I guess for competition is -- for lack of a better word.

I think that when you try to acquire businesses so that you don't have competition, that is taking away from the competition, which is exactly why the Sherman Act was

enacted.

THE COURT: Uh-huh. So what I hear you say is a lot of "I thinks" and "I feel." And so I think I understand generally your theory, but what evidence do you have to support those statements?

MR. MOATES: So I submitted the government's complaints, and then also I sent -- I'm sorry, I'm pulling this -- I planned to use the government's complaints and the facts from the government to defend against the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act claims, which are in the evidence in my second amended complaint.

THE COURT: Okay. So --

MR. MOATES: And there was evidence attached to those as well.

THE COURT: All right. So this is your chance to do that here today, not necessarily for your entire lawsuit, but to support your request for injunctive relief.

So is there any specific evidence that you would like to point the Court to, or do you just want to generally reference that attached to your second amended complaint?

MR. MOATES: I would like to, Judge, generally reference that. The biggest piece of information that I would like to point out is the statement that is in the complaint by the FTC, that Mark Zuckerberg had stated that they needed to get -- they needed to end the competition.

And that is in the -- I'm sorry. Just one second. I am looking. It is in Exhibit S, FTC v. Facebook.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Now, as to irreparable injury, as to that particular claim, what's the irreparable injury?

MR. MOATES: So a couple of important aspects. So, as I stated, based on the acquisition of these companies, all of them collectively, when they banned me across them after those -- you know, like they did those acquisitions and they banned people across them, for me it is there is multiple issues here.

It is business data that I can no longer access that is extremely important and relevant, for example, analytical data that is on those pages that plays into the day-to-day self -- my own self-interests and business operations as a sole proprietor --

THE COURT: Okay. Wait. Don't move on yet. So what business data specifically is on the accounts that you referenced earlier that you don't otherwise have access to?

MR. MOATES: So there is the analytical data on those pages and groups, which includes numbers of active users of engagements. There are names, addresses, and phone numbers. There are private messages between me and other businesses and contractors and associates.

THE COURT: And do you conduct a particular

business using these accounts?

MR. MOATES: I conduct multiple businesses using these accounts, Judge. I -- separate from that of DC Chronicle, I do independently -- I do as an independent contractor, I do different things for different organizations.

For example, I was a writer for the Washington Examiner. I conduct my own private Facebook page, which I use for my own personal business.

THE COURT: And what is your personal business?

MR. MOATES: I do side journalism outside of

DC Chronicle, and I also do a nonprofit charity foundation.

I do -- I do donations and stuff of that nature to other organizations, not myself. I am not running an organization.

I am saying I use it for that purpose to -- I have done fundraising. I have done donations and stuff like that, as well.

Also, talk about, you know, outside business as well, school. I use it for school. I have information that is relevant to my doctoral course work. I'm a doctor of education student. All of that information that is stored in those messages is extremely relevant and important to me on being successful and passing my classes because I can't access that information at this moment.

THE COURT: And you are talking about the

analytical data that you are using for, I guess a thesis statement or something like that?

MR. MOATES: For -- yes, for multiple papers and for course work. So there is the analytical data. There is the -- and it is not just the analytical data. There is the messages just between other individuals, people like I have worked with that I need access to; you know, things of those natures.

To be completely blunt, when the counselors introduced in their response to me that, you know, we needed to preserve the status quo, my argument to that was -- is they didn't disable all of my accounts.

So with those accounts still being active, I am responsible for things that I cannot control. And what I mean by that, for example, is Facebook has left those groups that I moderate and I admin. as being active even though my account is disabled.

So those -- so people that are posting into those groups can post things, and Facebook can turn around and say -- if they don't like it, they will say they will take this group down because of the content that is in this group, or we are going to limit the access because we don't like the content in this group. And I am the sole person responsible for those groups, but I don't have access to them. So, basically, I can be punished for something that I don't have

control over, if that makes sense.

THE COURT: Well, you are not necessarily being punished, but you are arguing I think that other people are being punished by visiting a website that -- or an account that still shows as active but that you no longer can access.

MR. MOATES: Well, what I am saying is that at the end of this case if you -- if I was to get access back to my Facebook account, those groups could be in jeopardy when they are not at this moment. Those groups right now are in good standing.

But let's say, for example, if someone posts in those groups something that they shouldn't, you know, something -- I can't even think. Let's say it goes against their fake news policy or it goes against one of their violence policies, I am not there to police that to remove it. But Facebook penalizes the group itself. So my group, in theory, could be penalized for not being moderated even though I don't have the access to moderate it. Does that make sense?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MOATES: Okay.

THE COURT: Okay. Any other argument that you want to present with regards to irreparable harm?

MR. MOATES: So there are a couple of quick things.

I -- irreparable harm. And this is a little bit on -- like I said, do you want me to just touch on the Sherman Act, or do you want to go ahead and expand a little bit? There were a couple of things I intended to add.

THE COURT: Well, I think for the purposes of today's hearing unless I am incorrect in interpreting your motion, it appears that your request for injunctive relief is based only on the Sherman Act claim.

MR. MOATES: That is correct. There were some actions that were taken after the initial complaint was filed. For example, I have been charged -- or attempted to be charged by Facebook. So, essentially, I am going -- and, again, this is -- I am informing the Court, it is my intention to file a complaint with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau because Facebook is continuing automatic debts against my debit card for advertising after I have revoked their authorizations.

So that is -- again, these are things -- they are little things -- but they attempted to charge me one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, 10, 11, 12, 13 -- 14 times since they have disabled my account, for over \$200.

THE COURT: So that is monetary relief, you will acknowledge, correct?

MR. MOATES: It is monetary, but it also is -- it is not just monetary. It also goes against my account.

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Well, when the bank denies it, they -- it is like a strike on my account because they are trying to charge me.

Now, I have notified the bank to issue a stop payment against those charges, but it is still a strike. And I did notify, I believe it was Mr. Kearney or Mr. Hamilton, that -- and also one of their other colleagues, is it -- I believe his name is Paven, that it was -- that that was my intention, and I sent them a formal letter, that the issue with that is, is not as much about the monetary issue as much as it is that my bank considers those transactions against my account. So it is a reputation score.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else?

MR. MOATES: And then the last thing, as I stated earlier, the regulation fair disclosure, the FD, is an issue. So, as I stated, I am a shareholder. There has been a \$34 billion loss since some of the -- being as they don't have access to those informations which are on -- inside the internal systems of Facebook, and that is part of the issue now. I don't think that is all monetary.

And then one last thing, and I put this in my evidence, it is redacted, and I am happy to provide the Court and the counselors with an original copy. I would like to do so under seal, if I need to.

There is a lot of records information that is stored that they have on Facebook, Instagram, et cetera, that

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is currently the subject of a Grand Jury subpoena. The government is investigating people that I was associated with, and so I provided some of that information to the government, continued to follow up with me and asked for more information.

Also, it would go to my defense if for some reason I was ever charged and I don't have access to that information. So that is -- that is a huge piece in itself. That data is -- that is irreparable harm. I mean, for me to not be able to provide that information to my own defense or to the government is a real problem.

That's all for now.

THE COURT: Okay. And when did that happen?

MR. MOATES: The initial -- the initial Grand Jury subpoena was in August. Before my account was disabled, I was working with the government, and I am still working with the government.

THE COURT: So are you working in tandem with the government, or is the government investigating people that you are associated with --

MR. MOATES: I am a witness.

THE COURT: You are a witness?

MR. MOATES: I am a witness for the government, that's correct.

They are investigating people that I was associated

with. Some people I was not associated with. But some people I was associated. And that information I'm just providing to them as we go along. I spoke with them less than a week ago.

THE COURT: You know that the government can access information in Facebook accounts by other means other than just the user itself, correct?

MR. MOATES: Yes, ma'am. But that does not give me the opportunity to give my counsel or my attorneys the information that I need in order to make sure that I am protected.

I would like to be able to make sure that any information that the government has that I also make available to my counsel so I can potentially defend myself. I want to make sure that my bases are covered as well. And it concerns me that, you know, even after -- and I introduced this into evidence -- even after Facebook telling me they would provide me that data, they have not.

THE COURT: And I guess that is what I was asking you about earlier when I was asking if you were a witness or if you were actually a subject or a target of an investigation because I thought I heard you mention something about a defense.

MR. MOATES: I am concerned, I am concerned,
Your Honor. I am a witness as of right now. But, you know,

just based on talking with my attorney, these things can spiral downhill.

THE COURT: So are you represented? Do you have a criminal defense attorney at this time?

MR. MOATES: I am consulting with an attorney. I have not retained one as of yet.

THE COURT: Okay. I will hear a response from the Defendants at this time.

And then, Mr. Moates, I will give you an opportunity to address anything from the response after.

I am not sure who is arguing for the Defendants.

MR. JORDAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor, I, Hamilton Jordan, I will be arguing on behalf of the Defendants today.

Can everyone hear me okay? Okay. Fantastic.

Your Honor, our December 11th written response to Mr. Moates's application lays out our positions on the four factors in fair detail. I think that -- and I defer to Your Honor, but I am inclined to begin by responding to some points raised in Mr. Moates's opening argument, and then I would be happy to answer any specific questions Your Honor may have.

THE COURT: I don't have any specific questions for you, Counsel. As I told Mr. Moates, I am focused on those first two factors, as that is where I see the probably most

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glaring issues with respect to injunctive relief. So you may proceed as you wish.

MR. JORDAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

So on those -- on those two factors, I mean, just starting with irreparable harm, I don't believe that we have heard anything today or seen anything in Mr. Moates's papers that clearly establishes, which is his burden, a substantial threat of injury if he is not -- if he must wait until the end of this lawsuit to win the relief that he seeks.

And just a couple of specific points on that,

Your Honor. I would like to raise first this shareholder

rights issue that Mr. Moates has addressed a couple of times

today.

It is our position, Your Honor, that that -- that that issue definitely was not part of his TRO application. believe it was not raised at all until the second amended complaint. And Mr. Moates has conceded, including on the record today, that he is only seeking injunctive and preliminary relief on the basis of the Sherman Act claim.

So to the extent that he is alleging some sort of shareholder rights access issue, we believe that that issue is not ripe.

But even if it were ripe, Your Honor, Mr. Moates has not clearly established any irreparable harm that would flow from his inability to access any information to which he

alleges he is entitled.

Even in the exhibits that he attaches rather -- last night, Your Honor, shortly after midnight we received an email with some additional information, additional exhibits from Mr. Moates.

And in one of those exhibits, which is exhibit -- I believe it is Exhibit E, that -- in the text that he even highlights, it says that Facebook provides certain shareholder information, not just through Mr. Zuckerberg's Facebook page but through other -- through other Facebook websites that do not appear to require, based on my initial review, any sort of Facebook account to access.

But our primary point here, Your Honor, is we think the shareholder rights issue is not ripe, and secondarily to that that it does not raise any irreparable harm issues.

If Mr. Moates through the course of this litigation is able to establish any injury along those lines, that injury could be remedied at the end of this lawsuit, likely with monetary compensation.

I also would like to respond to a couple of other specific points that Mr. Moates raises. He -- on the -- on sort of the -- oh, for one, Your Honor, he alleges that Facebook has -- rather, he expresses concerns with the status of his WhatsApp, CrowdTangle, and Oculus accounts. And I would just like to assure the Court that Facebook is

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undertaking reasonable efforts to identify and preserve all relevant information related to all of Mr. Moates's accounts.

As to WhatsApp in particular, yes, we have been in communication with Mr. Moates about this issue. To date, we are continuing to investigate it, but we have not been able to identify any WhatsApp associated with Mr. Moates. We have reached out to him and asked if he could provide the telephone number that he used to sign up.

I understand from Mr. Moates that he does not recall that telephone number. We are going to continue to investigate this issue to see if we can get to the bottom of it, but all of these efforts, Your Honor, are being undertaken in good faith, as is Facebook's duty, to preserve and identify all relevant information.

And a restraining order is certainly not warranted or appropriate to ensure that Facebook is undertaking the duties that it is already undertaking, as it is required to do as a civil litigant.

On the issue of the merits of his antitrust claim,
Mr. Moates briefly discussed certain communications with
Facebook, as well as certain terms in Facebook's terms of
service.

Your Honor, his communications with Facebook and the terms and conditions of the contract he entered into with Facebook, those are not relevant to any sort of antitrust

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theory, Your Honor. And, frankly, we are not seeing this -it really appears, Your Honor, that this is a private dispute
between Facebook and Mr. Moates over his access to his
accounts.

He is trying to turn this into something much bigger that challenges Facebook's entire existence. And we think that this is really -- the types of harms he is alleging in his complaint and that he has referenced in the temporary restraining order application are not the sort of harms that the Sherman Act was implemented to protect and to guard against.

And to Your Honor's point, to the extent that

Mr. Moates is voicing concerns regarding Facebook's alleged

targeting of competition, those are just concerns. You asked

Mr. Moates what his best evidence is, and he referenced,

frankly, not evidence, Your Honor, but just a complaint from

another lawsuit. A pleading is not evidence, much less a

pleading from another case.

And Mr. Moates specifically referenced a statement referenced in one of those complaints in which Mr. Zuckerberg allegedly made some comments about Facebook's competition.

Well, Mr. Moates today has not established that he is a competitor of Facebook, nor has he established that he has standing to vindicate the rights of Facebook's competitors in an antitrust action.

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As for his claim that his business data that -- his inability to access business data raises the risk of irreparable harm, Your Honor, we -- you know, I would say again that Mr. Moates has not established clearly, as he must, that his ability to access this data could not be -- or, rather, his inability to access the data could not be compensated at some later date with monetary relief.

And there is not evidence on the record to establish that. And to grant a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order, Mr. Moates must come in with evidence, and he must clearly establish on all four factors his entitlement to relief. And we believe it is clear from the record that he has not done that today.

THE COURT: So if you can educate me briefly on the typical protocols of Facebook when it suspends or deactivates an account. I understand that it preserves that information, but am I correct in understanding that it will not provide a copy of that information to the account holder?

MR. JORDAN: Your Honor, we are still -- I just want to be clear about the extent of the representations that I can make on the record about this today to Your Honor. We are continuing to investigate this issue, but Facebook's current position, which is -- is that the reason for Mr. Moates's account disabling -- and he acknowledges this, by the way, in his second amended complaint -- he concedes

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that he operated a page with a title relating to QAnon.

It is public information that was in the last several months that Facebook has implemented a policy through which it has been identifying and removing accounts and pages related to the QAnon movement.

And so, Your Honor, currently on the basis of the reasons for Mr. Moates's account disabling, it is unclear that -- or rather -- I will rephrase that, Your Honor.

Currently, Your Honor, we are not in a position to be able to offer to Mr. Moates that -- any ability to return his data, based on the reasons for the disabling of his account. But we are preserving the data for the duration of this litigation, as is our obligation.

THE COURT: Okay. I am familiar generally with the positions that Facebook has recently taken with regard to QAnon and other similar groups. And I guess that was my question, although I am not -- I'm not sure it is entirely relevant for the emergency issue today. I am sure this is not the first time it has come up.

And so I was just curious if there was any sort of protocols in place at the moment with respect to all of the accounts that fall under that umbrella and giving those account holders access to their data.

MR. JORDAN: Understood, Your Honor. And I will just say that because this is a relatively new issue, and a

new policy change, I am not in a position today to sort of make a broad representation about how Facebook is approaching those deactivated accounts as far as the data.

But I can say that for this case Facebook is identifying and retaining the data -- the known data associated with Mr. Moates. And, certainly, for the purposes of today's request for emergency relief, we agree with Your Honor that it is not necessary to resolve that particular issue about the extent of Facebook's data retention policies to hold that Mr. Moates is not entitled to emergency relief.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else you would like to say in response to Mr. Moates's request for injunctive relief?

MR. JORDAN: Your Honor, I would -- I just would like to make sure I touch on a couple of other points he made.

Mr. Moates discussed an issue implying that the alleged continuing charges against Mr. Moates's credit card or bank account might risk some issue of good standing with his bank. Our position on that would be that, to the extent there is any injury there, that also sounds like an injury that surely could be compensated with monetary relief.

And, lastly, on this issue about this subpoena to which, you know, and this notion that Mr. Moates is a witness

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to a pending investigation, you know, to the extent that Mr. Moates is concerned about his own criminal exposure and the possibility of eventually being a defendant, as Your Honor noted, the government has other means through which it can access information, and to the extent that the government eventually finds itself with information to which Mr. Moates feels he is entitled if he were a defendant, of course, the government would have a Brady obligation to turn over any exculpatory information to him.

THE COURT: Well, right, but what if it is not Brady material? If it is material that is not helpful to him, they don't have an obligation to turn it over prior to at least any type of trial.

And so it would seem to me that if -- and this is not -- this is not of concern today because these are not the facts, at least as they have been represented, but to the extent that Mr. Moates does become the target of a criminal investigation, you know, that could be a different issue in terms of his ability to access information that could be obtained in other ways by the government and/or used in a criminal defense. Again, not before us here today, but, you know, that is a different issue.

MR. JORDAN: Understood, Your Honor. And for present purposes, Mr. Moates has alleged that he is a witness, and on the basis of the current record, there

is -- he has not clearly established there is any risk of harm to him as a witness in the government's -- or rather in his inability to currently access whatever specific data -- or whatever particular data, the specifics of it are currently unknown on the record, but he has not clearly established that.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much.

Mr. Moates, as I told you earlier, I will give you a chance to reply to any of the points that were just made. What would you like to state at this time?

MR. MOATES: Yes, ma'am. So to clarify,

Counselor -- one of the first things that Counselor said that

I agreed that the only thing that I was bringing forth today

was in regards to the Sherman Act. I don't agree with that

statement, and here is why.

When you asked me if that was the case, I told you, I think, the circumstances had changed.

THE COURT: But what -- but what his point was, and he is accurate, in your motion that is pending before the Court, which was set for this hearing today, which is the emergency motion for temporary restraining order, it appears from that filing that, at least at the time this filing was made, the request was based only on the Sherman Act claim. And so, even though you allege that circumstances have transpired since then, that is not before the Court today.

And that is the point that he was making.

MR. MOATES: I understand. My statement is in response to when you asked me earlier if that was the only thing that I was alleging. I wanted to clarify that.

Now, in retrospect with regards to the data and the irreparable harm, when we are talking about -- if we go back to the Sherman Act for a second, there is the -- he said that I am not a competitor of Facebook, which I wholeheartedly disagree with for multiple reasons.

I am a publisher. Facebook is a publisher. They employ journalism organizations to write articles -- I say employ, contract, however they want to define it. They pay people to write articles that they then promote in their own field. Those articles are competition from what I do.

In addition, I provide content. Facebook also provides content that competes with me, in their news feed. That is competition. We do compete.

Now, on the big business aspect of it, there are different -- there are different business operations. But to say that we don't compete against each other, is not accurate. In fact, I would say that Facebook has an interest in competing against publishers when they publish things to get their articles seen higher than those of other publishers.

THE COURT: But you are a user of Facebook. So how

can it be that you are a user of Facebook but now you are alleging you are a competitor of Facebook?

MR. MOATES: I am both, Your Honor, at least in my view, because I publish information as a journalist so I have the ability to -- when I -- like, for example -- I will make it very simple -- Facebook employs fact-checkers. Those fact-checkers write articles that they then promote in news feed when they disagree with someone else who has posted.

So, in theory, Facebook is employing journalists or contracting with journalists that they then promote above other publishers. That is direct competition to my business. I do journalism. I write articles. So Facebook is competing with me.

They compete with me on Facebook, on Instagram, on Oculus -- I'm sorry, not Oculus -- on CrowdTangle. And all of this data is relevant.

You know, the analytics, he said that there was no irreparable harm. There absolutely is irreparable harm in competition. When you start talking about things like having access to business data, this is not monetary. Those names and addresses and phone numbers, the information that I have as far as numbers, that's not a monetary thing that they can simply pay back. It is information that I need now.

We have a chain of events, you know, current events that are going on. For example, right now I cannot

communicate with those who have signed up for my newsletter because Facebook has restricted my access. In two weeks Donald Trump will no longer be President. It will not be relevant. And they can't just pay that off. These are things that I -- that current events will not be able to be back-dated.

This information is relevant now. I need those names, I need those numbers, and I need the information. And Facebook has taken out a competitor, which I compete against them, like I said with publishing, they have taken out a competitor and basically made it so I can't access that information.

And Facebook has conceded that you are -- and based on his statements with regards to the terms of service, he said they are not relevant. I think they are absolutely relevant. When you enter into an agreement with someone, those -- those terms are relevant. They say that you can download your data at any time. That is in my second amended complaint. It is in the exhibits.

They then further went on to say they were going to provide me that data. They sent me URLs and links to get that data. But those URLs were inactive. I mean, this is clearly a competitive publishing issue here. And Facebook may be a platform, but they are also a publisher.

And so that information is relevant to me and they

are competing against me and I need that information. And I think that that is important when you are talking about competition. They need to provide that information. At the bare minimum, they are competing against me, and they are not holding up contractual agreements.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else?

MR. MOATES: I have a motion after we are done.

THE COURT: What, that you intend to file?

MR. MOATES: Yes, ma'am. A request.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MOATES: Yes, ma'am. I was going to ask -- I know that it is uncommon, I have asthma and upper respiratory problems, so I would like the Court to grant me leave to file electronically.

I already have a Pacer account, but the court denied me access to come into the building because -- based on a doctor's recommendation, based on the State of Texas and CDC guidelines, because of my asthma, I have been instructed not to wear a mask. So it puts me at risk to go out into public to mail items to you guys and to also to come to the court. And the court wouldn't even let me in. I would like the ability to upload electronically if that is possible.

THE COURT: I am not authorized to grant that request. Our pro se litigants cannot file electronically. I will visit with the Clerk about your particular issue. You

definitely won't be allowed into the courthouse without a mask. That is our policy, and there is no leniency to that --

MR. MOATES: I understand.

THE COURT: -- for the safety of all of the court personnel. But I will talk to our Clerk and see if there is any discretion that I have, given your particular circumstance.

MR. MOATES: Thank you. I appreciate it.

THE COURT: Okay.

All right. One last housekeeping matter before we adjourn today. I will issue an order as quickly as possible, although I want it to be substantive enough to address some of these issues. And I will just sort of be forthright and open, typically -- with the parties -- typically I would have scheduled this hearing earlier. There were some procedural issues, given Mr. Moates proceeding pro se and initially including another party that -- so we had to address those issues.

But my entire family was exposed and came down with COVID. So the Court has been operating remotely and was a little bit delayed due to that. So we are -- we will be back in the courthouse and working up to full speed. So I will get this out quickly.

The thing I need to address with you is a

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procedural issue. And I know Mr. Thames is familiar with this issue that I am going to address because it is an issue that frequently comes up, at least in our division, and in our district I believe as a whole, and that is the issue of cases that I am assigned to for pretrial only versus cases that are referred to me for the entire case including the trial.

For substantive motions for cases that I am only -the case is only referred to me for pretrial, which is the
circumstance in this case, I believe, at this point, meaning
that unless all parties file a consent to proceed before me
for trial, that is how the case will remain, which is fine.

My orders for non-substantive issues will be final, regardless. For substantive issues in a referral case but not for trial, my opinions on substantive issues will be in the form of a report and recommendation, which means that either party will have 14 days to file objections, and then the entire issue will be considered by -- this is -- Judge Mazzant is the District Judge on this case currently. And so that is for the entire case at large.

For purposes of injunctive relief, because I am considering the issue of preliminary injunctive relief and not just the issue of temporary restraining order, it makes it a little bit easier because we don't have that only 14-day window that you have got to consider.

But I do like to know from the parties on the record, you do have the option, even if you don't want to consent for the entire case -- that is not a question I will ask you right now because you would file the required paperwork to do that for the case to be transferred to me -- but for purposes of injunctive relief, you do have the option to consent on the record for purposes of injunctive relief only.

You don't have to do that. If you don't want to do that, then I will issue a report and recommendation. Just understand that there will be a delay period because we will have to allow for the 14-day objection time period, as well as for then the District Judge to consider this issue on the papers.

Is that clear? Like I said, I know Mr. Thames is familiar with this issue.

Mr. Moates, do you understand what I am saying?
MR. MOATES: Yes, ma'am, I do.

THE COURT: Okay. And so, like I said, I won't ask you for the entire case at this point. For the purposes of injunctive relief, is it the parties' preference to consent for the purposes of injunctive relief, or is it the parties' preference to just proceed as we are and me issue my opinion in the form of a report and recommendation?

MR. KEARNEY: Your Honor --

MR. MOATES: I -- I'm sorry.

MR. KEARNEY: Go ahead.

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MR. MOATES: Go ahead.

MR. KEARNEY: I was going to say, Your Honor, I apologize that we hadn't considered this issue before the hearing today. We would just like briefly opportunity to confer with our client, and we can get back to Your Honor very quickly on that, if that was okay.

THE COURT: No. I absolutely understand wanting to confer with your client on that issue. The only issue is, because I am not asking you for the purposes of the entire case which would warrant the particular, I think it is a one-sentence filing that you would make in the event that you are consenting to the entire case, but the consent on the record if that is something that you do intend to give, particularly if it is only for injunctive relief --

MR. THAMES: Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. THAMES: Your Honor, I was going to say,

Counsel and I have been attempting to discuss it on email

while you were talking, but we do need to have our client

sign off before we can actually make that representation,

but -- and I may be stepping a little too far with my

co-Counsel here, but I believe we could probably file

something, a notice with the Court today, informing Your

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Honor of that decision. We just need blessing before we do
something that --
          THE COURT: Yeah. I understand that.
         MR. KEARNEY: I agree with Mr. Thames in terms of
that is what we would like to do.
          THE COURT: All right. And I will say that in our
consent form that Mr. Thames is familiar with and is on the
District's web page, it is for a general consent. That
language can be modified that you want to limit it only for
the purposes of consideration of the preliminary injunction.
And so I will just -- I will just wait to hear from
Defendants on that issue.
         Mr. Moates, do you want to do the same thing, or do
you want to tell me now?
         MR. MOATES: I filed, I believe, already with the
Court my approval for the entire case with you.
          THE COURT: Okay.
         MR. MOATES: And I stand by that.
          THE COURT: Okay. I do need both parties -- or all
parties involved to consent. Otherwise, the case will
proceed as it is.
         MR. MOATES: Yes, ma'am.
          THE COURT: And so with that issue being addressed,
we will stand adjourned. Thank you all.
         MR. THAMES: Thank you, Your Honor.
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MR. JORDAN: Thank you. MR. MOATES: Thank you. MR. THAMES: I hope your family is doing well. THE COURT: Thank you. (Video hearing adjourned.) **CERTIFICATION** I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript from the video recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter to the best of my ability. January 25, 2021 <u>/s/ Shea Sloan</u> SHEA SLOAN, CSR, RPR TRANSCRIBER